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I.

INTRODUCTION

Most of us love the idea of saving money by purchasing multiple products at
once. But are better deals always good for competition and consumers? Answering this question requires a headlong dive into the puzzle1 of bundling and
bundled discounts, and the short answer is: “not always.” Bundled discounts
include “buy one, get one” offers, prix-fixe dinner specials, and rebates for
meeting multi-product sales targets, to name a few prominent examples. A
bundled discount occurs “when a seller offers a collection of different goods
for a lower price than the aggregate price for which it would sell the constituent products individually.”2 The “defining characteristic” of bundled discounts
is that “they are multi-product, purchase target discounts—they are conditioned upon purchasing some quantum of goods from multiple product markets.”3
This Article considers the legal rules used to determine whether a particular
instance of bundled discounting is anticompetitive, and it identifies weaknesses
* Law Clerk, Hon. Gabriel W. Gorenstein, United States Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York. J.D., New York University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Georgetown
University, 2010. I am grateful to Eleanor Fox and Daniel Rubinfeld for helping me develop
this topic and to Chris Sagers for very helpful dialogue and feedback on earlier drafts.
Thanks are similarly due to Paul Brachman, Vaughn Morrison, and Jordan Rodriguez for
helpful comments and advice. I would also like to express my gratitude to my family, especially Robert Pollina, Sr., and to Caitlin Hussey, for always being my biggest fan (even
when all I wanted to talk about was bundled discounts). I welcome all feedback at
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1
See Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 345 (2003) (referring to the “puzzle of
exclusionary conduct”).
2
Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1689
(2005); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 403 (4th ed. 2008)
(“[D]iscounts are often attached to a buyer’s purchase of two different things together.”).
3
Lambert, supra note 2, at 1694.

74

2014]

False Negatives Under a Discount Attribution Test

75

in a popular approach for evaluating the competitive effects of bundling. A
recent set of transactions in the telecommunications sector4 is utilized to illustrate the shortcomings of a price-cost test for bundled discounts, showing that a
rule declaring all discounts that result in prices above some unit of incremental
cost often fails to detect anticompetitive bundling in certain industries.5 This
discussion will illustrate the conditions under which a bundling practice may
be anticompetitive, but nonetheless legal under the “discount attribution
test”—a test that provides a rule of per se legality for “above cost”6 bundled
discounts—adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cascade Health
Solutions v. PeaceHealth.7 The conclusions drawn in this article, together with
the fact that industries prone to such errors are prevalent, indicates that the theory underlying the Ninth Circuit’s test is flawed.
Bundled discounts that raise anticompetitive concerns traditionally involve
the grouping of one or more products over which an incumbent firm has substantial market power (the “bundling” product) along with a product that faces
more robust competition (the “competitive” product). 8 As this Article will
demonstrate, it is rather easy for firms to employ bundled discounts anticompetitively, where two conditions are present: the package’s bundling products are insulated with high barriers to entry and the bundled products experience extremely low marginal costs.9 Consequently, where these conditions are
present, incumbent firms may successfully deter entry through two primary
means: First, they may take advantage of high barriers to entry in the bundling
product markets to erect multi-tiered entry barriers, making it harder for com-

See infra Part I.
The case study I examine has been the subject of a Department of Justice Antitrust
Division enforcement action that ended in a consent decree. See infra, note 47 and accompanying text.
6
See discussion infra note 17 (providing a fuller explanation of “above-cost” discounts).
7
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007).
8
Many—indeed probably most—bundled discounts do not raise competitive concerns,
and are simply groups of products offered at a package price that is discounted off of the
price of the products purchased separately. See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 2, at 1689-92.
9
Although I refer to “marginal costs” at various points in this Article, the Cascade test
uses average variable cost to determine whether or not a discount is “below cost.” Cascade
Health Solution, 502 F.3d at 910. The conclusions drawn here are not affected by which
measure of cost is used, as marginal cost and average variable cost are similar in the industries discussed. The operative intuition for the purposes of this Article is that in certain industries, wireless mobile services being the example used here, the increase in cost that is
incurred from serving an additional customer is negligible for an efficient wireless network.
Average variable cost is often used to approximate marginal cost, since marginal cost is
difficult to measure. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 716 (1975); see generally Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d 895.
4
5
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petitors to contest the individual competitive product market.10 The difficulty
arises because new entrants must invest in entering multiple markets at once to
make a comparable package offer to consumers.11 Second, incumbents may use
limit-pricing strategies by effectively dropping the price on the competitive
product down to marginal cost—which is often near zero in many industries—
to undermine new entry by signaling the unprofitability of entering the competitive product market.12 This limit-pricing strategy is especially effective
where there are substantial barriers to entry into the competitive product market itself, since structural disincentives to enter already exist.13 Moreover, it is
possible for incumbents to achieve this sort of exclusion without offending the
Cascade rule of per se legality for above-cost discounts, since below-cost (i.e.,
“predatory”) pricing is unnecessary to deter entry in these particular ways.
A typical bundling case is brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,14
and alleges the foreclosure of a dominant firm’s horizontal rival from some
market, customer, or opportunity.15 The theory underlying a typical bundling
case16 is that the firm is excluded because it is less diversified in what it produces and cannot offer a comparable bundle consisting of all products sold by
the dominant bundling firm.17 Importantly, under this theory, anticompetitive
See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1694.
See id.
12 See generally Aaron R. Moore, Anticompetitive Bundled Discounts: A Way Out of the
Wilderness, 37 J. CORP. L. 951 (2012); Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d 895.
13 See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1694.
14 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). This discussion does not delve the specific requirements for
making out a claim of monopolization or attempted monopolization in court. Instead, it is
concerned with describing bundling as a predicate act for a monopolization-related offense.
For such a discussion, see Spectrum Sport v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (outlining the specific requirements for making out a claim of monopolization or attempted monopolization); see also Moore, supra note 12, at 958.
15 Moore, supra note 12, at 954 (“There is not yet a Supreme Court ruling concerning
bundled discounts, and the circuit courts are in disagreement about which bundled discounts
are anticompetitive. Bundled discounts sit in a unique legal middle ground between predatory pricing and product tying, demonstrating some elements of each.”)
16 Scholars disagree over whether bundling of this sort can even be anticompetitive; still
others believe it can be anticompetitive but should never be illegal. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp sums up the theory underlying anticompetitive bundling in the following way:
“Bundled discounts might be thought to threaten competition when the dominant firm
makes several goods while rivals make only one good or perhaps some subset of the dominant firm’s offering.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 404. See also Barry Nalebuff, Bundling
As a Way to Leverage Monopoly (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper Series ES, Paper No.
36, Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://commcns.org/1dYGM5v (arguing that “in the general
case, a monopolist can earn higher profits by leveraging its power into a competitive market.”). The late Judge Robert Bork provides a viewpoint critical to this theory of exclusionary bundling, as well as one of the most famous criticisms of the theory. See ROBERT A.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372–75 (1978) (proposing an alternative viewpoint regarding leveraging power in a competitive marketplace).
17 See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55
10
11
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exclusion is still possible even if the marginalized firm can provide the product
as efficiently as the bundler. Similarly, the theory holds that exclusion is still a
possibility if the incumbent firm’s pricing is above cost and, therefore, not
“predatory.”18 One of the central difficulties with evaluating bundled discounts
then, is to decide how to treat non-predatory bundles that may still be anticompetitive. Courts have endeavored to fashion methodologies that can appropriately separate pro-competitive bundles from anticompetitive ones, and there
currently exists a split among the circuits in how to treat bundled discounts
under the antitrust laws.19
The two dominant schools of thought in antitrust bundling analyses revolve
around the Third Circuit’s decision in LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M 20 and the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth. 21 In the
LePage’s case, the court condemned a self-admitted monopolist’s bundled rebate program based on traditional Section 2 principles, without requiring a
showing of below-cost pricing.22 It distinguished bundling from predatory pricing, for which there is a rule of per se legality for above-cost discounts.23 The
EMORY L.J. 424, 425 (2006) (“Mixed bundling strategies may be employed by a dominant
firm to foreclose competition by a single-product competitor that is unable to match the
multiproduct or multimarket discounts and therefore loses sales in the sole market in which
it competes with the dominant firm.”).
18 An oft-cited example is Judge Kaplan’s hypothetical involving the sale of shampoo
and conditioner:
Assume for the sake of simplicity that the case involved the sale of two hair products,
shampoo and conditioner, the latter made only by A and the former by both A and B.
Assume as well that both must be used to wash one’s hair. Assume further that A’s average variable cost for conditioner is $2.50, that its average variable cost for shampoo
is $1.50, and that B’s average variable cost for shampoo is $1.25. B therefore is the
more efficient producer of shampoo. Finally, assume that A prices conditioner and
shampoo at $5 and $3, respectively, if bought separately but at $3 and $2.25 if bought
as part of a package. Absent the package pricing, A’s price for both products is $8. B
therefore must price its shampoo at or below $3 in order to compete effectively with A,
given that the customer will be paying A $5 for conditioner irrespective of which
shampoo supplier it chooses. With the package pricing, the customer can purchase both
products from A for $5.25, a price above the sum of A’s average variable cost for both
products. In order for B to compete, however, it must persuade the customer to buy B’s
shampoo while purchasing its conditioner from A for $5. In order to do that, B cannot
charge more than $0.25 for shampoo, as the customer otherwise will find A’s package
cheaper than buying conditioner from A and shampoo from B. On these assumptions,
A would force B out of the shampoo market, notwithstanding that B is the more efficient producer of shampoo, without pricing either of A’s products below average variable cost.
Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
19 Lambert, supra note 2, at 1699-1700 (outlining five possible approaches courts could
take in evaluating bundled discounts).
20 See generally LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
21 See generally Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007).
22 LePage’s, Inc., 324 F.3d at 144.
23 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 209-11
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court held that this rule (i.e., above-cost discounting is always legal) did not
apply in non-oligopolistic markets.24 It ultimately found the monopolist’s bundling program to be exclusionary under Section 2. 25 Under
the LePage’s decision, bundling may be deemed unlawful exclusionary conduct under the general rule in Aspen Skiing,26 where the U.S. Supreme Court
defined anticompetitive conduct as “behavior that impairs the opportunities of
rivals through conduct that either does not constitute competition on the merits
or achieves a competitive benefit in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”27
In the second major bundling case, Cascade, the court adopted a “discount
attribution” cost-based test containing an above-cost safe harbor.28 Under that
test, the full amount of discounts given by the defendant on the bundle is allocated to the competitive product.29 The bundle will not be declared illegal under Section 2 unless the resulting price of the competitive product is below the
firm’s average variable cost to produce it.30 The Cascade court adapted the rule
of per se legality for above-cost discounts from predatory pricing doctrine to
the bundling scenario.31 It expressed concern that an erroneous finding of antitrust liability (i.e., a type I error or “false positive”), and concomitant treble
damages award, would be too likely to occur under the framework of the
LePage’s decision.32 That prospect, according to the LePage’s court, would
chill price-cutting and ultimately lead to higher prices for consumers.33 These
concerns prompted the court to adopt a bright-line, price-cost rule that provided a standard of legality based on a company’s own cost information.34
(1993) (holding that any simple price cut in the single-product context, resulting in a price
exceeding the seller’s cost, is immune from antitrust liability).
24 LePage’s, Inc., 324 F.3d at 168–69.
25 The court upheld jury findings imposing liability on the defendant under section 2 of
the Sherman Act. LePage’s, Inc., 324 F. 3d at 155–57 (explaining that the principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates as offered by 3M is that “when offered by a monopolist, they may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable
offer.”). It concluded that, “3M used its monopoly in transparent tape, backed by its considerable catalog of products, to squeeze out LePage’s.” Id. at 157 (In effect, customers who
wanted to reap the full rebate amount offered by 3M had to purchase products in numerous
categories, while LePage’s only competed in the transparent tape market.”).
26 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
27 See Jonathan Rubin, Bundling as Exclusionary Pricing to Maintain Monopoly, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 5 (June 2008).
28 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2007).
29 Id.
30 Id. The court ultimately adopted average variable cost as the appropriate measurement of incremental cost, and vacated the district court’s finding of liability on the bundling-related monopolization claim. Id. at 917.
31 Id. at 905.
32 Id. at 908.
33 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2003).
34 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 907.
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Using the above-mentioned telecommunications agreements as a lens, this
Article contends that the discount attribution test adopted by the Ninth Circuit
is unacceptably prone to producing false negatives.35 This result is likely because the test requires a showing of below-cost pricing on the product facing
competition.36 But in product markets in which average variable costs of production are close to zero, as they are in the mobile wireless market (the “bundled” product in the LePage’s case),37 an anticompetitive bundling strategy is
essentially immune from liability in all but the most extreme cases involving
the deepest of discounts. This is an important and, as this Article will argue,
probably unintended consequence of this rule of law— if a firm does not price
below cost on its bundle, it does not necessarily follow that the bundle is procompetitive or competition-neutral.38 Even accepting that antitrust law should
prefer false negatives to false positives,39 there is strong reason to believe that
industries prone to false negatives are more common than the court in Cascade
could have imagined.40 The main intuition here is that the broad space for discounting—as a result of extremely low costs of production in telecommunica35 A “false negative,” or “Type II error,” is an underinclusiveness error, and refers to an
instance of anticompetitive conduct going undetected. In the context of antitrust law, this
would be a judicial finding that no antitrust violation occurred, when in fact the defendant’s
conduct is actually anticompetitive. On the other hand, a false positive, or “Type I error,” is
an over-inclusiveness error. In antitrust, this would be represented by a judicial finding that
a defendant committed an antitrust violation, when the conduct was not actually anticompetitive. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711 (1996) (defining and discussing these terms in
the context of securities law).
36 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 898.
37 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, 3M v. LePage’s Inc., 542 U.S. 953
(2004) (No. 02-1865).
38 Professor Aaron Edlin has proposed using “consumer betterment” in place of a pricecost test for determining whether low-prices in the single-product scenario are anticompetitive. AARON EDLIN, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 39 (Einer
El Hauge ed., 2013). Instead of asking whether a challenged practice is likely to exclude an
equally or more efficient competitor from the defendant’s market, Edlin would ask whether
“the challenged practice is likely . . . to exclude . . . a competitor who would provide consumers a better deal than they would get from the monopoly.” Id.
39 See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 86
(2010). Devlin and Jacobs present the accepted wisdom: “[m]ore than any other area of civil
law, antitrust is error-prone.” Id. As they explain, faced with such uncertainty in application
of the law, antitrust has adopted a decision-theoretic standard that prefers underenforcement
to overenforcement. Id. As a result, “this principle has significantly influenced the substantive and procedural barriers to recovery created by the courts” and that “[d]octrine has been
deliberately crafted to siphon off complaints that bear an unacceptable propensity for false
positives.” Id. This inclination to err on the side of underenforcement has “aligned the U.S.
judiciary in large degree with the conservative teachings of the Chicago School.” Id. at 84.
See also Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV.
871 (2011) (arguing that the antitrust decisions of the Roberts Court are consistent with the
Chicago School preference for false negatives over false positives).
40 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 908.
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tions and other industries—raises the prospect that firms may use bundling to
deter entry into certain markets by firms that would become as efficient as the
existing firms. These observations, in turn, could be applied to future instances
of bundled discounting in markets that share structural similarities with those
discussed here.41 Indeed, the discussion will contend that such effects are likely
to occur in a non-trivial number of cases, making the concern with underinclusion more practical than theoretical, and calling into question the decision-theoretical underpinnings of the rule adopted in Cascade. Therefore, it is
my position that if a legal rule or formulation can be fashioned that does not
also tend to affirmatively protect inefficiencies, then the discount attribution
test is not a panacea for addressing the competitive harms that may stem from
a bundled discount program.
The test’s operative mechanism—a cost-based standard42— leads to an underinclusive approach to liability that may yield many more false negatives
than the Ninth Circuit probably contemplated. Because the Cascade price-cost
test43 does not contain a mechanism for addressing the competitive effects of
bundled discounts short of excluding an existing and equally efficient competitor, there is good reason to seek out an alternate approach. The work of this
Article, however, is not to propose an alternative to the discount attribution
test.44 Instead, the goal here is to demonstrate that any adherence to it must accept that it is best understood as an underinclusive rule of prophylaxis, and not
a final solution to the bundling and bundled discounts puzzle. Moreover, the
41 Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761,
815 (2002).
42 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 905.
43 See supra note 36.
44 Alternative doctrinal solutions have been suggested, although I do not evaluate them
here. Professor Thomas Lambert, for example, has proposed a “third way” alternative to
LePage’s and Cascade. Under Lambert’s approach, an above-cost bundled discount is presumed legal, but the plaintiff would still have the opportunity to prove “certain easily ascertainable facts indicating genuine exclusion of an efficient rival.” Lambert, supra note 39.
This proposed test would require the following showings: there are barriers to entry in the
product market in which the plaintiff does not compete as well as the competitive product
market; the plaintiff cannot practically coordinate with other producers to produce a competing bundle; and the plaintiff made a good faith effort to become a supplier to the discounter
but was rebuffed. See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1742. While Lambert’s approach recognizes
that above-cost bundled discounts can be exclusionary, it would not look beyond exclusion
of existing rivals. In his work in the area of single-product predatory pricing, Professor
Edlin, on the other hand, has proposed incorporating a sensitivity to the opportunities of new
and potential entrants who are not yet efficient. See Aaron Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost
Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 945 (2002). Edlin’s test for exclusionary singleproduct pricing proposes that, in markets where incumbents “enjoy significant advantages
over potential entrants, but another firm enters and provides buyers with a substantial discount, the monopoly should be prevented from responding with substantial price cuts or
significant product advancements until the entrant has had a reasonable time to recover its
entry costs and become viable.” Id.
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weakness of the price-cost model45 suggests that jurisdictions implementing
new liability rules for bundled discounts should consider the creation of an
alternate model.
This Article will point out the ways in which the telecommunications bundle
could be used anti-competitively,46 while still passing muster under the test. In
Part I, I describe the new product bundle that forms the basis of the case study
I rely upon to draw my conclusions, and in Part II, I outline the contours of the
two dominant approaches to addressing the legality of the bundled discounts
under the antitrust laws. In Part III, I describe the theory behind the notion that
low prices can also be anticompetitive prices. In Part IV, I demonstrate how
the Cascade test could produce a false negative. Finally, in Part V, I argue that
false negatives are actually much more prevalent than proponents of that rule
might expect, concluding that the Cascade test relies upon a decision-theoretic
framework that is ill-suited to evaluating bundled discounts in several critical
sectors of our economy.
II.

THE QUAD PLAY BUNDLE

In December 2011, Verizon Wireless and several cable companies (the “Cable Defendants”)47 entered into a series of commercial agreements (the “Commercial Agreements”) that would allow them to market “quad play” bundles
for retail sale.48 These four-part packages consist of residential voice, video
and broadband services, along with wireless mobile telephone service.49 Residential voice, video and broadband services are commonly offered and purchased in bundles known as “triple plays.”50 Companies that provide each
component service themselves typically offer these three-part bundles.51 But
when a company cannot supply each service, it may partner with complemen-

See Lambert, supra note 2, at 1690; Edlin, supra note 44, at 955.
Professor Daniel Rubinfeld has written that in the bundling context, “[a]s a general
rule, one might view bundled rebates as anticompetitive if they (a) reduce consumers welfare, and (b) do so by impairing rivals’ ability to make competitive offers to potential customers.” Daniel Rubinfeld, 3M’s Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 243, 251 (2005).
47 The Cable Defendants are Comcast, Time Warner, Cox, and Bright House Networks.
Complaint at 1, United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 12-CV-01354 (D.D.C. Aug.
16, 2012), 2012 WL 3528463.
48 Id. at 2.
49 News Release: Verizon’s New ‘Quad-Play’ Bundle Offers Customers Wireless Calling With Home Phone, TV and Broadband in Money-Saving Combinations, VERIZON (Oct.
19, 2009), http://commcns.org/1f9M9Pp.
50 Complaint, supra note 47, at 6.
51 Competitive Impact Statement at 6, United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No.
12-CV-01354 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2012), 2012 WL 3868038.
45
46
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tary providers to offer bundles.52
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Verizon perceives opportunities for growth in the development of integrated wireline-wireless services, but
only offers FiOS, its brand of wireline services, in a portion of the country.53
The Cable Defendants, on the other hand, each have a large customer base and
a broad geographic footprint, and are thus attractive partners for providing
complementary component services to Verizon Wireless in its attempt to offer
a four-part bundle.54 The sale of a quad play bundle, however, raises the prospect of harm to competition,55 since several of the Cable Defendants possess
monopoly power in certain geographic markets in the United States.56 This discussion focuses on the particular risk of harm to competition in the wireless
market and will refer to that market as the “competitive” market because the
discount attribution tests speaks in terms of a “competitive” product market
and focuses on the “product facing competition”;57 however, there is substantial debate as to whether the wireless market is actually “competitive” in the
traditional sense of the word.58
Id.
Final Judgment at 5, United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 12-CV-01354
(D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013).
54 There surely are a host of other competition issues raised by these agreements. For
example, the Cable Defendants and Verizon Wireless are competitors in some markets, and
may become competitors in the wireless service market; however, these issues are beyond
the scope of this discussion. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 51.
55 Moore, supra note 12, at 954. Although the quad play would be offered by multiple
firms as a cross-seller bundle, analysis of its competitive effects could probably take place
under either section 1 or 2, the latter route would potentially be appropriate given that the
package would contain one or more monopoly products. Courts will almost certainly analyze a bundling challenge the same way, regardless of the section of the Sherman Act under
which the plaintiff brings the suit.
56 The arguments in this Article proceed on the uncontroversial assumption that some
Cable Defendants possess monopoly power, or at least substantial market power, in some
local markets over voice, video, or broadband. In re Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27
F.C.C.R. 8610, 8627 (July 20, 2012); see also SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE
TELECOM INDUSTRY & MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 9 (2013) (describing the
existence of monopoly power in numerous geographic areas over numerous services in the
telecommunications industry). The Department of Justice also views the relevant markets
and market power this way, though it did not pursue monopolization claims in its suit to
enjoin the deals. See Complaint, supra note 47, at 11 (“The Cable Defendants are dominant
in many local markets for both video and broadband services.”). The Antitrust Division sued
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, pursuing litigation based on nationwide market share
figures. Id. This approach was surely a more efficient way for the government to remedy the
antitrust concerns stemming from the deals and, in fact, the DOJ did not pursue the theory
proposed in this Article. Nonetheless, this choice of litigation strategy says little about the
viability of the theory of competitive harm via bundling analyzed here.
57 See infra note 61.
58 Compare Second Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 11-CV01560 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2011) (describing high levels concentration in mobile wireless and
52
53
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Bundling in competitive markets, of course, ordinarily raises no concern for
antitrust.59 Indeed, there are many pro-competitive or competitive-neutral explanations for why mixed bundling occurs.60 However, mixed bundling may
also be used by dominant firms to protect or maintain a monopoly, or to extend
monopoly power into competitive markets.61 Consequently, there are several
ways in which bundling can be harmful to competition.62 The antitrust concerns
raised by the Commercial Agreements, as well as the circuit split described in
this Article, provide a good opportunity to re-examine contemporary bundling
analysis under the antitrust laws, as there are several reasons to conclude that
the four-part bundle to be sold by Verizon Wireless, in partnership with the
Cable Defendants, can be used to the detriment of competition in the wireless
service market.63 The remainder of this Article describes two dominant approaches to evaluating bundled discounts and observes several difficulties with
the Ninth Circuit’s rule (despite it being the more popular approach) by identifying some of the ways that the test may yield false negatives, or instances of
anticompetitive conduct going undetected.64 In addition to having been adopted
by the Ninth Circuit, the discount attribution test has been employed in two
district court cases in the Second Circuit and was recommended by the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission.65 Additionally, a group of antitrust
arguing that the four large providers, who provided more than 90% of service connections
nationwide, were “well-positioned to drive competition at both a national and local level”),
with Gerald R. Faulhaber et al., Assessing Competition in U.S. Wireless Markets: Review of
the FCC’s Competition Reports, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 319, 328–29 (2012) (arguing that indirect evidence of market power derived from market definition analysis is an antiquated approach, and that the wireless industry is actually “effectively competitive”).
59 Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 707, 708 (2005).
60 Professor Daniel Crane has catalogued some of the most significant procompetitive
and competitively-neutral reasons that firms engage in mixed bundling. He explains that
bundling may yield cost efficiencies, including economies of scope and transactions costs
savings, and that bundling can be a form of procompetitive price discrimination. Crane,
supra note 17, at 431-32.
61 Again, this view is not uncontroversial. See id. at 427 n.11.
62 Id. at 443 (explaining that the two main theories of anticompetitive bundling are forcing rival firms to price unprofitably and creating entry barriers by raising rivals’ costs).
63 For the sake of illustration, this discussion focuses on the agreements as they stood
before the Department of Justice sued to enjoin the transactions, winning fundamental concessions reflected in a Proposed Final Judgment filed with the D.C. District Court. See
Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 51, at 3–4. It therefore focuses on the bundlingrelated harms that would have resulted had the government not intervened. The court has
approved the settlement; therefore, it will operate as a consent decree. See Final Judgment,
United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 12-CV-01354 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013).
64 See supra note 35.
65 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 99 (Apr.
2007). The recommendation stated, inter alia, that courts should require a plaintiff to show
that “after allocating all discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bundle of products to
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law professors urged its adoption as amici curiae in Cascade itself.66
III.

EVALUATING BUNDLED DISCOUNTS: A SPLIT AMONG
THE CIRCUITS

This section summarizes the Third Circuit’s approach to evaluating bundled
discounts, articulated in LePage’s v. 3M,67 as well as the Ninth Circuit approach from Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth.68
A. The Third Circuit Exclusionary Conduct Approach
In this case, LePage’s, a manufacturer of private label transparent tape, alleged that 3M maintained a monopoly in the market for transparent tape by,
among other things, a bundled rebate program for large retail stores.69 The discounts were conditioned on purchasers meeting sales targets in six diverse
categories including health care, home care, home improvement, stationery
(including transparent tape), retail auto and “leisure time.”70 The number of
product categories in which the purchaser met 3M’s stated target determined
the size of the discount.71 The court noted that “[i]f a customer failed to meet
the target for any one product, its failure would cause it to lose the rebate
across the line. This created a substantial incentive for each customer to meet
the targets across all product lines to maximize its rebates.”72 In effect, customers who wanted to reap the full rebate amount offered by 3M had to purchase
products in numerous categories. However LePage’s only competed in the
transparent tape market and lost sales when several retail chains shifted their
tape purchases to 3M.73 LePage’s alleged that to defeat this shift, it would have
to compensate purchasers for the loss of rebates across all of those product
lines, and not just the loss of tape-specific rebates, which it could not do based
the competitive product, the defendant sold the competitive product below its incremental
cost for the competitive product.”
66 See Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee PeaceHealth Supporting Reversal of the Verdict Concerning Bundled Discounts at 2, Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (2007) (No. 05-35627).
Professors Crane, Lambert, Morgan, Sokol and Squire argued that “bundled discounts
should never be unlawful unless, at a minimum, the seller has charged a below-cost price in
the competitive market after discounts given in the non-competitive market are reallocated
to the competitive market.” Id.
67 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
68 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir. 2007).
69 LePage’s, Inc., 324 F. 3d at 145.
70 Id. at 154.
71 Id. at 145.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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on its limited product line.74
In declining to analogize bundling to predatory pricing,75 the court observed
that bundled rebates might be anticompetitive when offered by a monopolist.76
The court reasoned that the principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates
occurs “when offered by a monopolist, [bundled discounts] may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture an
equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.”77 The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, ultimately affirmed the trial
court’s judgment in favor of LePage’s.78 The court concluded, “the jury could
reasonably find that 3M used its monopoly in transparent tape, backed by its
considerable catalog of products, to squeeze out LePage’s.”79 The court relied
on more familiar principles of Section 2 exclusionary conduct, eschewing a
cost-based test.80 It did not require LePage’s to show that it, or a hypothetically
equally efficient (as 3M) competitor could not meet the discounts without pricing below cost.81
B. The Ninth Circuit Cost-Based Rule
In Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,82 PeaceHealth and Cascade’s
predecessor, McKenzie, was a competitor in the markets for primary and secondary acute-care hospital services. 83 PeaceHealth also provided “tertiary
care,” which includes more complex services like invasive cardiovascular surgery, with over a 90% market share in certain sub-specialties.84 McKenzie did
not provide tertiary care services.85 PeaceHealth began to offer bundled service
packages to some insurance companies, including large discounts on tertiary
services, if the insurer made PeaceHealth its sole preferred provider of all services—primary, secondary and tertiary.86 McKenzie sued under Section 2, alleging that PeaceHealth engaged in anticompetitive conduct by offering these
bundled discounts to the insurance companies. McKenzie argued that PeaceId. at 174.
Id. at 155.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 141.
79 Id. at 157.
80 Id. at 152-54.
81 See Gary P. Zanfagna, LePage’s v. 3M: A Reality Check, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Nov.
2004), available at http://commcns.org/KMkzMo.
82 See generally Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007).
83 Id. at 892–93.
84 Id. at 891.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 892.
74
75
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Health had “coerced” insurers into purchasing primary and secondary services
from PeaceHealth based on its monopoly power in tertiary care.87
The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case so that the
trial court could instruct the jury on a new cost-based rule announced by the
court:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for the purposes of a
monopolization
or
attempted
monopolization
claim
under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after allocating the discount
given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to the competitive product or
products, the defendant sold the competitive product or products below its average
variable cost of producing them.88

The court held that the “exclusionary conduct element of a claim arising
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act cannot be satisfied by reference to bundled
discounts unless the discounts result in prices that are below an appropriate
measure of the defendant’s costs.”89 It adopted a “discount attribution” standard under which the “full amount of the discounts given by the defendant on
the bundle are allocated to the competitive product or products.”90 Under this
standard, if the “resulting price of the competitive product . . . is below the defendant’s incremental cost to produce them, the trier of fact may infer the bundle is exclusionary,” for the purposes of Section 2.91 According to the court,
this standard would only condemn those bundles that have the potential to exclude a “hypothetical equally efficient producer of the competitive product.”92
The Ninth Circuit, in adopting this rule with an above-cost safe harbor, recalled that the Supreme Court had “forcefully suggested” that prices above
some measure of incremental cost should not be condemned under the antitrust
laws.93 This view stemmed from a fear of chilling legitimate price-cutting.94
The court therefore extended the predatory pricing rule announced in the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Id. at 893.
Id. at 910.
89 Id. at 903.
90 Id. at 906.
91 Id.
92 Id. It should also be noted that the requirement of below-cost pricing is best understood as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for finding a bundle to be exclusionary
under this test; if a firm’s bundle “fails” the test, it is presumably still given an opportunity
to offer an efficiency justification. Professor Lambert, for example advocates for certain
additional showings. These would include a requirement that the complaining rival show
first that barriers to entry in other product markets prevented it from expanding its scope to
offer a competing bundle, and that it could not have collaborated with sellers of products
within those other product markets to offer a competitive cross-seller bundle. See Lambert,
supra note 2, at 1745.
93 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 901.
94 Id.
87
88
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Corp.,95 an opinion that has been highly resonant in judicial and scholarly attempts to arrive at a satisfactory bundling analysis.96 The Ninth Circuit felt
bound to the rule that “a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival’s low prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs.”97 It continued, recalling that
“the Court [in Brooke Group] went on to emphasize that ‘[l]ow prices benefit
consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.’”98 It once again noted that
the Court in Brooke Group stated a general rule: “the exclusionary effect of
prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure
of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.”99 Thus, it is clear that the
Ninth Circuit resolved to adopt a bundling analysis modeled after the Supreme
Court’s predatory pricing doctrine. It was influenced by the Supreme Court’s
reasoning that low prices are the essence of competition on the merits, and that
a more nuanced rule would threaten to chill this usually precompetitive conduct.100
IV.

LOW-PRICING AND ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM

At the outset, it is crucial to keep in mind that low pricing is the very conduct that antitrust aims to promote.101 Many commentators—perhaps most fa95 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 209-11
(1993).
96 The Ninth Circuit also cited the work of the Antitrust Modernization Commission,
which reasoned that its proposed test would “as a whole, bring the law on bundled discounting in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group.” Cascade Health Solutions,
515 F.3d at 900 (internal citations omitted).
97 Id. at 901 (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 222 (1993)).
98 Id. at 901.
99 Id.
100 The Ninth Circuit Court elaborated:
In Weyerhaeuser, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, reminded us that, in
Brooke Group, the Court had cautioned that “the costs of erroneous findings of
predatory-pricing liability were quite high because [t]he mechanism by which a
firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same mechanism by
which a firm stimulates competition, and therefore, mistaken findings of liability
would chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”
Id. at 903 (alteration in original) (quoting Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 320 (2007)).
101 Harm to competition may result even where a dominant firm’s course of conduct
initially involves price-cutting. Upon taking the helm as Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust, Christine reminded the antitrust community of this in withdrawing the “Section 2
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mously, Robert Bork 102 —have forcefully argued that harm to competition
through low-pricing is so unlikely, and that the risks of discouraging low prices
by condemning low-prices are so unbearable that the law should never concern
itself with the possibility that a dominant firm could cause competitive harm
through prices that are “too low.”103
Indeed, the Chicago School104 vision that low-price predation is so difficult
so as to be non-existent, and therefore, no concern of antitrust is thoroughly
ingrained in the contemporary case law.105 This view underlies the requirement
of below-cost pricing found in both Brooke Group and Cascade, and pervades
contemporary antitrust law.106 Commentators who have urged the adoption of
Report,” which constituted the DOJ’s enforcement policy for single-firm conduct. See
Christine Varney, Remarks As Prepared for the Center for American Progress on the Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era 7 (May 11, 2009), available at
http://commcns.org/1dYHhfT; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION & MONOPOLY:
SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 91 (Sept. 2008), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ public/reports/236681.pdf. She expressed concerns with liability rules and enforcement policies that focus heavily on short-term competition while giving
scant attention to longer-term welfare effects of dominant firm conduct. Id. Notably, she
stated that “extreme hesitancy” in addressing potential abuses by monopoly firms “goes too
far in evaluating the importance of preserving possible efficiencies and understates the importance of redressing exclusionary and predatory acts that result in harm to competition,
distort markets, and increase barriers to entry. Id. The ultimate result is that consumers are
harmed through higher prices, reduced product variety, and slower innovation.” Id. She
advocated a “back to basics” approach to evaluating single-firm conduct on the belief that
“an excessive concern for risk of over-deterrence” was unwise. Id.
102 Dylan Matthews, Antitrust Was Defined by Robert Bork. I Cannot Overstate His Influence, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2012), http://commcns.org/1bkRbDX.
103 BORK, supra note 16, at 154 (“It seems unwise, therefore, to construct rules about a
phenomenon [price predation] that probably does not exist or which, should it exist in very
rare cases, the courts would have grave difficulty distinguishing from competitive price
behavior. It is almost certain that attempts to apply such rules would do much more harm
than good.”).
104 See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: THEORY & EXECUTION 31 (2005) (noting that the Chicago School of antitrust analysis has been characterized as a “pro-market” and “largely anti-interventionist vision of antitrust” based upon neoclassical economics and the view that “in the long run markets tend to correct their own
imperfections”); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925 (1979) (describing the “Chicago School” of antitrust analysis and contrasting it
with the “Harvard School”).
105 See Christopher Fallie, Antitrust Consensus Shifting As Courts Weigh Impact of Monopolists and Predators, FORBES (May 10, 2013), http://commcns.org/1eVZ2dH.
106 See, e.g., Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)
(“[T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely
tried, and even more rarely successful.”); Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 323 (2007) (in the context of predatory bidding, the Court
repeated that the actions taken as part of a scheme of predation are “often the very essence
of competition” and that a failed predatory scheme may benefit consumers through lower
prices) (citations omitted); Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, 555 U.S.
438, 451 (2009) (“To avoid chilling aggressive price competition, we have carefully limited
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rules meant to protect low prices,107 and courts that have adopted such rules,108
surely have given careful consideration to the possibility that instances of anticompetitive conduct may go undetected. It is undoubtedly good policy to protect low-pricing with strong rules designed to protect the incentive to discount,
and to treat complaints that prices are “too low” in a fairly restrictive manner.
This policy, however, may appropriately be called into question when the risk
of false negatives greatly rises, and the associated fear of deterring procompetitive price-cutting by imposing a more inclusive liability rule falls. A
firm’s attempt to shield itself with entry barriers to eliminate latent competitive
threats via bundling, for example, is quite likely to be safe from liability under
the discount attribution test in many industries, notably telecommunications
industries. 109 That there are entire industries where conventional Chicago
School low-pricing rules yield lots of false negatives110 may undermine, or at
least call into question, the efficacy of rules that rest on a preference for false
negatives over false positives and have been crafted so as to allow low-pricing
even where a particular instance may be anticompetitive. At the very least, it
raises concerns that the discount attribution test is not an effective mechanism
for accurately condemning anticompetitive bundled discounts because of its
special vulnerability to underinclusiveness in many industries.
the circumstances under which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by alleging that
prices are too low.”). See also Daniel A. Crane & D. Daniel Sokol, The Antitrust-Busters
with Gavels, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://commcns.org/1hnSTJ6. In their op-ed, Professors Crane and Sokol noted that, in contrast to the perverse law of pricing conduct that
pervaded the 1960s which tended to protect inefficient competitors, “[b]eginning in the
1980s, the Supreme Court began to recognize that aggressive price-cutting is exactly the sort
of behavior that antitrust law should encourage, because it helps consumers” and to that end,
“the justices [have] made clear that any antitrust claim predicated on the argument that a
firm excluded its rival through low prices would require proof that the defendant engaged in
predatory, below-cost pricing.” They criticized the result in ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton
Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
jury’s liability determination in a case where a company alleged that its competitor had excluded it through market-share rebates, though without requiring any showing of below-cost
pricing. They urged the Supreme Court to review the case, and to “reaffirm that above-cost
discounting cannot be the basis of an antitrust challenge.” Id. The Court ultimately denied
certiorari in the case. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2025 (2013).
107 See Daniel Fisher, Robert Bork, The Man Who Redefined Antitrust, Is Dead At 85,
FORBES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://commcns.org/1jqDxrh.
108 See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1403
(7th Cir. 1989) (noting that a firm that increases production in a stagnant market only decreases prices, which benefits consumers and is the opposite of a monopoly).
109 See infra Part IV for an in-depth discussion.
110 See Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L. J. 585, 591 (1994) (noting that post-Chicago school economics
recognizes that “false negatives” can occur in industries where the price-cutter lowers its
prices to a level below the competitor, but still above its own average cost).
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To say that articulating a one-size-fits all definition of anticompetitive conduct is difficult would be an understatement.111 This is especially true in the
context of pricing conduct, where the most straightforward method of price
competition—cost-cutting—may also be a very effective mechanism to exclude existing competitors and potential entrants.112 Indeed, the primary battleground in the law of pricing conduct revolves around the dispute over whether
low-pricing can ever be anticompetitive if it does not result in a below-cost
price on a product facing competition, and if so, whether this should be declared illegal in any circumstances.113 The position taken here is that some industries merit greater concern for false negatives, and that the law rightly concerns itself with addressing anticompetitive low-pricing. Dominant firms may
erect114 entry barriers without even coming close to pricing below their own
costs, which is required under the contemporary law on predation as well as by
the discount attribution test for bundled discounts.115 Strategic entry deterrence
can indeed be anticompetitive even where it involves price-cutting, and this
strategy is especially potent where entry barriers are high and the product markets involved have extremely low marginal costs.116
111 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and
Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002) (providing a historical overview of
U.S. antitrust law and its inherent tensions).
112 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009) (“[C]utting
prices in order to increase business is often the very essence of competition.”) (quoting Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
113 The scholarship in this field certainly indicates that this issue is paramount in the
minds of prominent commentators. Compare, e.g., Edlin, supra note 44, at 941-42 (arguing
that “there is no compelling reason to restrict predation cases to below-cost pricing, as
above-cost pricing can also hurt consumers by limiting competition”) with Elhauge, Why
Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for
Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 684, 686 (2003) (opposing Edlin’s
view).
114 References in this Article to “erecting” entry barriers refers to what Professor Steven
Salop has called “strategic” creation of new barriers to entry, which may be distinguished
from “innocent” entry barriers. According to Salop, innocent barriers are unintentionally
erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization. By contrast, a strategic barrier is
purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry. Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 335 (1979). Although “innocent” entry barriers are not purposely
created by incumbents in order to stifle entry, they nonetheless may present a favorable
structural characteristic of the market that can make strategic entry deterrence more effective for incumbent firms.
115 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968) (a barrier to entry is
“a condition that imposes higher long-run costs of production on a new entrant than are
borne by the firms already in the market”).
116 Interpreting the holding in the Microsoft antitrust litigation, Professor Eleanor Fox
summarized “anticompetitive” conduct as follows: “Conduct that intentionally, significantly, and without business justification excludes a potential competitor from outlets (even
though not in the relevant market), where access to those outlets is a necessary though not
sufficient condition to waging a challenge to a monopolist and fear of the challenge prompts
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Price-cutting in these industries, in turn, can be used strategically to eliminate competitive checks and ultimately be price-raising. Professor Aaron Edlin,
in his seminal paper arguing that above-cost predation is of real concern to
antitrust, contended that “a firm that preserves its monopoly by charging low
prices only when its rivals make the mistake of entering the market, and only
until they exit, denies consumers the benefits from competition on the merits.”117 Similarly, Professor Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop have observed that “potential competition [may] provide[] a competitive check on established firms distinct from the check that established firms exert on each
other.”118 Further, if price-cutting is “sharp-shooting,”119 —targeted at particular
anticompetitive threats rather than an efficient attempt to maximize profits —
the case for finding a given bundled discounting scheme to be anticompetitive
is bolstered.120 While prices may decrease today under a bundled deal, this does
not mean that consumers will ultimately benefit and may only reflect a retrenchment of established firms. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that its test would
protect competition, not competitors, by only condemning bundled discounts
that would exclude an equally-efficient producer of the competitive product.121
However, the structure of certain industries supports expanding the class of
anticompetitive practices reprehended liability rules from exclusion of equallyefficient rivals to include marginalization of new entrants from the market.122
the conduct, is ‘anticompetitive.’” Fox, supra note 111, at 390, 391. Fox also argued that this
was not the only test for exclusionary conduct, but that it is “one test in fact applied by
courts to conduct that significantly forecloses competition on the merits and is not efficiency
justified.” Id.
117 Edlin, supra note 44, at 966.
118 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 246 (1986).
119 This term is most often used in airline predation, where dominant airlines deliberately
incur losses in markets where their dominance is threatened. See Chris Sagers, “Rarely
Tried and . . . Rarely Successful”: Theoretically Impossible Price Predation Among the
Airlines, 74 J. AIR. L. & COMM. 919, 924 (2009) (quoting Aviation Competition Hearing:
Before the Subcomm. On Aviation, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
105th Cong. 1067 (1998)) (“[A]n incumbent . . . that is deliberately accepting financial
losses selectively in the markets where it is subject to competitive challenge [ ] [is] engaging
in . . . discriminatory sharp-shooting” and is engaged in predation.) (internal citations omitted).
120 In these ways, the Article relies in large part on the Aspen definition of anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 605 (1985).
121 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2007).
122 This is not to suggest that adherents to rules of per se legality for above-cost pricing
fail to recognize that above-cost pricing can be anticompetitive. The implication here is that
market structures, which are prevalent in the economy may be of such a character that anticompetitive low-pricing is much easier to carry out given certain structural characteristics.
As a result, the short shrift given to the possibility of false negatives supports altering the
rules to capture practices that are not usually thought to threaten competition.
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Harm to competition does not arise solely when a competitor is sidelined by a
predatory scheme, but also results from exclusion of new companies123 from a
market, a result that can be accomplished using above-cost bundled discounts.124 What a strict price-cost test lacks, therefore, is the ability to address
bundled discount programs that amount to anticompetitive125 strategic entry
deterrence strategies.126 These strategies may deprive consumers of the salient
effects of new entry, even by firms who are not yet as efficient as the incumbents. In other words, there is good reason to consider the effects that new entrants—even less efficient ones—will have on consumer welfare. As Edlin has
put it, “[i]nefficient rivals often provide important competition, or at least
could provide important competition if competition law limited their exclusion.” 127 There is also a strong argument to be made that the Cascade court’s
reliance on Brooke Group was faulty in the first instance. The direct and immediate benefit that consumers gain from single-product price-cutting provided the concern for false positives, which largely drove the outcome in
Brooke Group, but these concerns may not be present in the bundling context.128
Critics of the decision in LePage’s generally express dismay that the Third
Circuit did not require a showing of below-cost pricing, but instead, employed
an approach that could wind up protecting inefficient competitors and discouraging aggressive discounting by dominant firms. 129 However, opponents of
123 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (explaining that
“[n]othing in § 2 of the Sherman Act limits its prohibition to actions taken against threats
that are already well-developed enough to serve as present substitutes”).
124 See, e.g., Jamie L. Weber, Backing Bundled Discounts After Brooke Group: Analyzing the Debate Over the Legality of Above-Cost Bundled Discounts, 94 IOWA L. REV. 775,
789 (2009) (noting that in addition to using a bundled discount as a predatory tool to exclude an existing equally-efficient rival, firms can also harm competition by using a bundled
discount to exclude new firms from entering the market).
125 In this article, the term “predatory” is reserved for below-cost bundling.
126 See Salop, supra note 114, at 533.
127 EDLIN, supra note 38, at 164.
128 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 27, at 5 (“Whether a particular instance of bundling does
or does not create consumer surplus in a particular case would depend on the circumstances.
Not so with predatory pricing, in which every penny of lower prices during the ‘pre recoupment’ phase inures to the benefit of consumers.”) (emphasis in original).
129 The Antitrust Modernization Commission lamented that the decision “offers no clear
standards by which firms can assess whether their bundled rebates are likely to pass antitrust
muster.” ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REP. & RECOMMENDATION 94 (2007); see
also Elai Katz, Market-Share Discounts Scrutinized by Third Circuit, 248 N.Y. L.J. 120, 212
(2012) (“The Third Circuit remains a vexing jurisdiction for dominant firms that discount
aggressively. The 2003 en banc opinion of the court in LePage’s v. 3M…left an inexact
standard for bundled discounts.”). But see Rubin, supra note 27, at 8 (“[T]he LePage’s decision was not ‘standardless,’ as the AMC and others have portrayed it. LePage’s demonstrated that the Aspen rule could provide reasonably good guidance to juries and judges
charged with evaluating the lawfulness of bundling and other exclusionary pricing strate-
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LePage’s, while correct that the decision may actually harm consumers in the
long run, should take pause in relying on a strict cost-based rule. This is because there is great potential for dominant firms to use above-cost bundled discounts to exclude new competitors from their markets, by offering bundled
discount programs in ways that do not constitute “competition on the merits.”130 A rule insulating all anticompetitive bundling so long as it is abovecost,131 in turn, poses a threat to competition that may not easily be appreciated.
Concluding that a firm’s low prices may actually be a part of an anticompetitive strategy to shut out new firms is also likely to be at odds with intuition.
But once it is recognized that cost-based rules are prophylactic in nature, and
are concerned with the chilling effects of false positives on incentives to cut
price, reliance on such a rule becomes less attractive in many circumstances.132
In attempting to decrease the incidence of these Type I errors and the social
cost associated with them, a rule of above-cost legality provides courts with a
blunt tool, and not a scalpel, for assessing competitive effects. Being left with
such an imprecise rule has significant consequences in industries like telecommunications, where fixed costs are extremely high and variable costs extremely low, since the accuracy of a price-cost test crumbles when applied in
such markets. As the following illustration based on the Quad Play shows,133 it
would do well to replace the Cascade rule with one that that would allow a
plaintiff to prove harm to competition even where a bundling firm prices above
cost.
V.

USING THE QUAD PLAY AS AN ANTICOMPETITIVE
DEVICE WITHOUT OFFENDING THE LAW

The preceding section argued that above-cost discounted prices can indeed
be anticompetitive.134 There, I took the position that a rule of above-cost legal-

gies.”).
130 See Edlin, supra note 44, at 952 (explaining that predatory pricing arises when a firm
charges abnormally low prices in order to drive rivals from the market, which do not reflect
competition on the merits).
131 See id. at 941-42 (arguing that “above-cost predation” may be more plausible and
prevalent that below-cost predation).
132 This is not to imply that the potential for underinclusiveness is totally lost on critics
of LePage’s. Indeed, many who favor prophylactic, cost-based rules do so because they
believe the risk of false positives under an alternative rule outweighs the risk of false negatives under a rule of above-cost legality. However, what this Article does suggest is that the
incidence of false negatives is much greater than proponents of Cascade Health Solutions or
Brooke Group probably imagine. The example of the quad play bundle provides one example. For others, see Part VI, infra.
133 See infra Part IV.
134 See supra Part III.
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ity is merely a prophylactic rule.135 This section now posits a situation where a
quad play bundle is sold in an anticompetitive way, yet in a way that would not
offend the discount attribution test. The exercise illustrates a “false negative”
(i.e., a type II error).136 It uses hypothetical numerical price values to illustrate
the possibility of this particular outcome. Of course, it is important to distinguish bundled discounts that constitute vigorous, pro-competitive price competition from those that are anticompetitive. As Robert Bork memorably stated,
we must distinguish “exclusion through efficiency from exclusion by means
unrelated to efficiency.”137 Generally understood, this concern is reflected in
the below-cost pricing requirement contained in both the Brooke Group and
Cascade tests.138 That is, courts have decided, as a matter of policy, that a law
permitting challenges to above-cost pricing would present inappropriate risks
of over-inclusion (i.e., false positives) and as a result, would deter aggressive
price competition to the detriment of consumers.139 As provided for in Brooke
Group, the law on predation has reflected a preference for false negatives over
false positives, on the theory that this arrangement is better for consumers.140 In
order to show that the theory underlying the decision to strike this balance may
actually be misconceived, this section concludes by briefly describing the
prevalence of markets with high fixed costs and extremely low average variable costs; the kinds of markets where the incidence of false negatives is likely
to be a great deal higher than the Brooke Group or Cascade courts could have
imagined.
A. A Hypothetical Application of the Discount Attribution Test
Assume that one of the Cable Defendants offers all three “triple play” components for $50 each per month, and that Verizon Wireless offers standard
wireless service for $50 per month. Sold individually (i.e., unbundled), these
products would cost a consumer $200 per month. As a four-part quad play
bundle, suppose that Verizon Wireless would reduce the package price from
$200 to $154. The total discount on the bundle is now $46 per month. Attributing that discount entirely to the competitive wireless product yields an effective price of $4.00 per month. Lastly, assume that Verizon’s average variable
cost for wireless phone service is close to zero, perhaps $3.00 per month. Un135
136

See id.
Stout, supra note 35 (defining and discussing these terms in the context of securities

law).
BORK, supra note 16, at 39.
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 210
(1993); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008).
139 Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 908-09.
140 Id.
137
138
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der these circumstances, the competitive product in the bundle is being offered
above its average variable cost of production. Accordingly, a single-product
rival of Verizon Wireless’s lawsuit would be dismissed in a jurisdiction using
the discount attribution test.141 Due to the low average variable costs on the
competitive product, any bundled discount up to $47.01 would be legal.142
However, as the next section will discuss,143 Verizon could harm competition in
wireless service without employing a discount quite so large.
The hypothetical application of the discount attribution test above shows
that an equally efficient single-product competitor of Verizon Wireless would
not be excluded from the wireless market under the given conditions. Since it
too could provide wireless service at $3.00 per month or less, it would not be
forced to price below cost in order to meet a bundled discount yielding an effective price of $4.00 per month for wireless service. But the chief problem is
that the discount attribution test does not account for anticompetitive entrylimitation strategies,144 and is solely concerned that a less-inclusive prophylactic rule would protect an inefficient existing competitor.145 It does not account
for the fact that in certain industries like telecommunications, high fixed costs
already pose a high barrier to entry, and because average variable costs of production for wireless service are only a few dollars per month (or a few cents
per minute),146 showing below-cost pricing on the competitive product in the
bundle would be nearly impossible in the mine run of cases in this industry.
Bundled discounts, while involving some “pro-competitive” short-term pricecutting, may also allow a dominant firm to put a new entrant out of business if
the new firm cannot reach minimum efficient scale, let alone recover its fixed
costs.147 Or it may allow the dominant firm to convince a potential entrant to
stay out of the market altogether. As these prospects indicate, above-cost pric141 To survive a motion to dismiss, it would have to allege that the Cox-Verizon bundle
was offering a discount of $47.01 under the posited price and cost values.
142 In other words, any discount up to that level would still yield a price on wireless that
is above the average variable cost on that component of the bundle, when the full discount
on the bundle is attributed only to that product.
143 See infra Part IV.B.
144 See Salop, supra note 114, at 79.
145 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUNDLED DISCOUNTS AND SINGLE PRODUCT LOYALTY DISCOUNTS, at
99-100, http://commcns.org/1aN0BeN.
146 Although I refer to “marginal costs” at various points in this Article, the Cascade test
uses average variable cost to determine whether or not a discount is “below cost” or not.
The conclusions drawn here should not change based on which measure of cost is used, as
marginal cost and average variable cost are similar in the industries discussed. The operative
intuition for the purposes of this Article are that in certain industries, wireless mobile services being the example used here, the increase in cost that is incurred from serving an additional customer is negligible for an efficient wireless network. Average variable cost is often
used to approximate marginal cost, since marginal cost is difficult to measure. Areeda &
Turner, supra note 10, at 716.
147 See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 118, at 214.
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ing does not necessarily indicate pro-competitive, or competitively-neutral
conduct. The Court in Brooke Group itself acknowledged that above-cost pricing, though henceforth not to be deemed illegal, could still be anticompetitive.148 It stated that above-cost pricing “either reflects the lower cost structure
of the alleged predator or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal
to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate pricecutting.”149 It is quite clear that the Court understood that above-cost pricing
can still be anticompetitive, and that it opted for an above-cost safe harbor
based on concerns for false positives and institutional competence.150 The Court
did not abandon the notion that above-cost pricing schemes can be exclusionary and anticompetitive.151
The above-cost safe harbor contained in the discount attribution test creates—and indeed may invite—the ability to market the quad play to limit entry
into the market for wireless service for anticompetitive reasons.152 The discount
attribution test requires a showing of below-cost pricing, but that will be very
difficult to prove in many cases, even where the net effect of the bundling
strategy is to reduce consumer welfare.153 Average variable costs, the measure
of cost relied upon by the test, is calculated by dividing variable cost by output.154 Wireless mobile service operators like Verizon Wireless experience tremendous economies of scale in production with average variable costs near
zero. 155 The discount attribution test thus gives bundling firms a lot of leeway
in which to discount a bundle without permitting a finding of liability because
discounts on the non-competitive products are allocated to a competitive product with very low average variable costs.156 This broad space for discounting
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993).
Id. (emphasis added).
150 See id. at 227.
151 Id. at 224.
152 See id. at 209 (holding that any simple price cut in the single-product context, resulting in a price exceeding the seller’s cost, is immune from antitrust liability); see also supra
Part I.
153 Jonathan B. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 7, June
2010, http://commcns.org/1hPbrTm.
154 ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 237 (8th ed. 2013); see
also Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 4: Predatory Pricing Analysis, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., 25 (Apr. 2012), available at
http://commcns.org/1atbTHx [hereinafter ICN Report].
155 See, e.g., Max Schanzenbach, Network Effects and Antitrust Law: Predation, Affirmative Defenses and the Case of U.S. v. Microsoft, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 15 (2002) (observing that many networks have declining marginal costs with near zero average variable
costs).
156 ICN Report, supra note 154, at 26-27. International Competition Network Working
Group on Unilateral Conduct has considered the implications of using various cost measures
in fashioning a framework for predatory pricing more generally. With regard to using average variable cost as the standard for a cost-based rule, it concluded the following: “[A] cost
148
149
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raises the leeway for firms to use bundling to deter entry into the wireless market by firms that would become as efficient as the existing firms.157 Anticompetitive strategies may be immune from scrutiny under the discount attribution
test because it relies only on a price-cost standard.158
B. Bundled Discounts and Anticompetitive Entry Deterrence in the Market
for Mobile Wireless
Recall Bork’s admonition that the law should not interfere with efficient
conduct that may also happen to “exclude.”159 Professor Susan Crawford has
recently offered some observations on the market structure in wireless mobile
service that buttresses the a priori conclusion that bundled discounts in this
industry would best be labeled as anticompetitive and exclusionary, rather efficient (but also exclusionary).160 According to Crawford, there is “no serious
competition” in mobile, which is dominated by four large carriers who are able
to set prices and earn margins of roughly 40 percent. Further, Crawford observes that, “barriers to entry for any new national player are insurmountable.” 161 According to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
“[s]ervice provider entry and exit decisions are primarily determined by the
height of structural entry barriers and expected post-entry market profitability
.”162 Likewise, there are two primary ways in which a bundled discount on the
quad play could be used to deter entry into the wireless market: (1) by creating
a multi-tiered entry problem and (2) by facilitating a limit pricing strategy.163
These two anticompetitive strategies go to the heart of a new wireless firm’s
entry decision. Furthermore, a bundled discount program designed to insulate
incumbent firms with entry barriers is of heightened competitive concern in the
wireless market, as opposed to other markets where the conditions are ripe for
measure from the lower end of the scale (e.g., average variable cost) may yield an enforcement standard that is more lenient, which . . .could produce more type II errors, or ‘false
negatives,’ (i.e., result in anticompetitive conduct going undetected.” Id.
157 Id.
158 Thomas A. Lambert, Weyerhauser and the Search for Antitrust’s Holy Grail, CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 277, 304 (2007) (Professor Lambert has identified the two primary ways in
which equally-efficient rival tests are prone to producing false negatives: they do not condemn practices that prevent rivals from becoming as efficient as the defendant, and they
may permit exclusion of the only competition a dominant firm is likely to face if that competition is less efficient than the dominant firm).
159 See infra note 137.
160 See CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 158.
161 Id.
162 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Fifteenth Report, WT Docket No. 10-133, ¶ 59 (June 27, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/1hPbLBz [hereinafter Fifteenth Wireless Competition Report].
163 Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 257-58, 261.
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strategic entry deterrence.164 This market is already highly concentrated165 and
entry barriers are already extremely high,166 making attempts to exclude newcomers even more effective in their potential to harm consumers.
One might argue that selling products close to cost is the paradigm of procompetitive, welfare-enhancing conduct. Indeed, purchasers of a four-part
bundle would certainly be thrilled to receive wireless service almost free-ofcharge. But what this argument, as well as the discount attribution test, leave
unaddressed is the ability to use steep discounts on an ad hoc basis to limit entry into the wireless market (e.g., by offering retail discounts only when new
wireless firms are actively readying to enter the market).167 Because it only asks
if the competitive product is sold below cost if all discounts are allocated to it,
the test would not prohibit strategic discounting designed to shelter Verizon
Wireless from future competition.168 With respect to the case of the quad play,
the test is a poor fit for analyzing bundled discounts in a market that is already
characterized by high concentration and multiple substantial barriers to entry.169
But more broadly, the test’s core concern with protecting efficient conduct by
dominant firms obscures the importance of reprehending acts that raise new
barriers to entry.170 Raising barriers removes competitive checks that ordinarily
spur innovation and reduction of prices across the board.171
164 As noted above, although wireless mobile has been deemed the “competitive market”
for the purposes of applying the discount attribution test, it may or may not be “competitive”
in the conventional sense. See supra, note 59 and accompanying text.
165 See David Cline, Consumer Choice: Is There an App for That?, 10 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 147, 148-49 (2012) (noting that four firms dominate the wireless market,
resulting in a Herfindahl-Hirshman Index ranging from 2000-6000, and that the DOJ Antitrust Division views concentration over 1800 as raising significant competitive concerns);
see also T. Randolph Beard et al., A Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in Mobile
Wireless Communications, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 639, 647 (2011) (“The potential for concentration in the wireless sector is especially acute due to the barrier to entry posed by the limited availability of spectrum.”) (internal quotations omitted).
166 According to the FCC, the primary barriers to entry in the wireless industry are: “(1)
the cost of acquiring spectrum licenses or spectrum leases; (2) network coverage costs such
as site acquisition and preparation costs, site construction and leasing costs, network equipment costs, backhaul transportation costs, and other potential interconnection and roaming
costs; (3) the costs of offering customers a portfolio of attractive wireless devices; and (4)
the costs of marketing an distributing wireless services and devices.” Fifteenth Wireless
Competition Report, supra note 162, ¶ 60.
167 Mark S. Popofsky, Section 2, Safe Harbors, and The Rule Of Reason, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1265, 1290 (2008).
168 Id.
169 See CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 158 (discussing high barriers to entry); Cline, supra
note 165, at 148-49 (noting that four firms dominate the wireless market, resulting in a Herfindahl-Hirshman Index ranging from 2000-6000, and that the DOJ Antitrust Division views
concentration over 1800 as raising significant competitive concerns).
170 Popofsky, supra note 167, at 1290.
171 Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 26 (2006).
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1. Multi-tiered Entry Problems
Daniel Crane explains the multi-tiered entry problem as a strategy that
“raises a rivals’ costs by forcing it to enter two or more markets simultaneously
in order to be able to meet the incumbent’s contingent discounts.”172 Assuming
that most consumers desire all four products in a quad play bundle, a new wireless entrant would not only need to attempt entry into the wireless market, but
would also need to attempt multi-tiered entry into voice, video and broadband
markets in order to make consumers indifferent as to which firm they purchase
wireless service from.173 Erecting this sort of entry barrier would be likely to
deter entry even by a hopeful wireless firm that could provide the service as
efficiently as Verizon Wireless.174 But the multi-tiered entry barrier posed in
this scenario is even more severe. It is exacerbated by the difficulty of entering
into the markets for voice, video and broadband, which would be necessary for
a rival wireless firm to offer its own four-part bundle.175 That is, entry barriers
are already high in the markets for video service and broadband Internet service.176 While bundling as a general matter increases barriers to entry, the probCrane, supra note 17, at 446.
A firm faced with the prospect of multi-tiered entry could certainly partner up with a
provider of complementary products in order to offer its own competing bundle. Interestingly, the facts of the Quad play case provide insight into how a firm like Verizon Wireless,
which wants to sell a four-part bundle pursuant to a cross-seller arrangement with various
cable companies, can also foreclose this avenue of competition. Specifically, the DOJ notes
that the Cable Defendants have a national market share for incumbent cable companies of
greater than 50% in these product markets and each has market power in numerous local
markets for broadband and video. As far as the DOJ is concerned, the “unlimited duration”
of the wireless exclusivity is anticompetitive because the ability to sell wireless services “in
combination with video or broadband services” may become an important component of
wireless competition, and the unlimited exclusivity would unreasonably foreclose competing wireless firms from offering integrated bundles with “the most significant providers of
video and broadband services.” Similarly, it would harm the ability of rival wireless carriers
to “provide constituent parts of those bundles.” See Competitive Impact Statement, supra
note 34, at 8-22. However, a full elaboration on the competitive effects resulting from crossseller bundling is beyond the scope of this Article.
174 See Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 257 (“A bundled rebate program could also increase
entry barriers by creating a two-level entry problem, forcing new entrants to enter a second
(or third) market in order to compete for the monopoly profits in its initial market. Such a
strategy could arguably be successful even if the monopolist did not price below its own
cost.”) (internal citation omitted).
175 Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 257.
176 See generally Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Innovation-Centric Approach of Telecommunications Infrastructure Regulation, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 221, 241 (noting large sunk
costs, high entry barriers and network effects in the telecommunications industry); see also
Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile Transaction,
64 FED. COMM. L.J. 47, 55 (“The inputs necessary to enter [into the market for mobile wireless telecommunications] include spectrum, towers, network equipment, and backhaul facili172
173
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lem is worsened where all or most of the packaged products come from markets with substantial existing barriers.177
A hypothetical will serve to more fully illustrate the anticompetitive nature
of bundling of this sort. Suppose that the discount offered by Verizon Wireless
was so large that the incremental payment that customers had to make in order
to add wireless service to the traditional “triple play” was less than it would
cost a potential entrant to enter the wireless market. Suppose also that the potential entrant was actually more efficient than Verizon at providing wireless
service, and that entry into voice, video and broadband would provide it with
no efficiencies. On these assumptions, a large discount of the sort posited in
Part IV on the four-part bundle could deny the more efficient potential entrant
the scale it would need to compete in the wireless market.178 Of course, a firm
that already competes in the voice, video, or broadband markets may have an
easier time contesting the wireless market, as its existing operations could
serve to mitigate the difficulty of multi-tiered entry. But relying solely on existing telecommunications firms to contest these markets only serves to bring
the entry problems described above into sharper relief.
2. Limit Pricing
Using bundling to deter entry by way of limit pricing is similar to the strategy described in the prior paragraph,179 but does not depend on raising rivals’
costs. Instead, it is a pricing strategy designed to convince potential entrants of
the unprofitability of entering the market.180 The basic idea is that “an established firm may be able to influence, through its current pricing policy alone,
other firms’ perceptions of the profitability of entering the firm’s markets, and
that the firm may thus set its prices below their short run maximizing levels in
order to deter entry.”181 This tactic could be employed when it looks as though

ties. We doubt there can be a serious claim that entry is easy.”); Richard Whitt, Evolving
Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Steps to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 488 (“Broadband networks. . . exhibit significant economies
of scale and scope, require access to patents, rights of way, and spectrum, and exhibit network externalities. In particular, costs generated from installing networks, establishing billing and support systems, and acquiring customers constitute substantial barriers to entry.”).
177 J. Shahar Dillbary, Predatory Bundling and the Exclusionary Standard, 67 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1231, 1250-51 (2010).
178 This hypothetical is adapted from one that Professor Rubinfeld used in his paper on
bundled rebates. See Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 258.
179 See supra Part IV.B.1.
180 Dillbary, supra note 177, at 1250-51.
181 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443, 443 (1982) (internal citation omitted).
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there is potential entry by a new wireless firm.182 Under incomplete information about the incumbent firm’s actual costs, a large but above-cost bundled
discount would likely cause the potential entrant to conclude that entry is unwise and decide against it.183 In other words, in a market like wireless service,
where firms face large sunk costs, a bundled discount arrangement that brings
expected profits practically down to marginal cost, as posited above, would
likely undermine the incentive to enter by signaling to a potential entrant that
the likelihood of a reasonable return on investment is slim. Even more, when
used in a targeted fashion,184 limit pricing of this sort could convince a potential
entrant that it would not even cover its fixed costs, let alone make a profit.185
The Solicitor General’s Office, writing as amicus curiae for the United States
in LePage’s, also suggested that the act of bundling is distinct from low prices
that result and, consequently, low-pricing through bundling may have a greater
potential to harm competition than single-product price cuts.186 However, the
literature does not contain an in-depth analysis of how and whether limit pricing via bundled discounts poses a greater potential for anticompetitive harm
than limit pricing via single-product price-cutting.187
Nevertheless, as in the multi-tiered entry scenario, it is in this type of situation that low-pricing could actually have an anticompetitive effect, contrary to
the usual intuition that lower prices are unquestionably good for consumers
and must denote pro-competitive conduct. By excluding potential entrants who
do not have the opportunity to achieve as equal efficiency as the dominant
firm, limit pricing is a tactic that strategically employs low prices to keep new
competitors out of the market.188 It does not do so by offering a superior prodDillbary, supra note 177, at 1250-51.
Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 181, at 443.
184 See Sagers, supra note 119, at 924.
185 See Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 4: Predatory Pricing Analysis, supra note
154, at 24 (“Note that the AVC [average variable cost] benchmark is in general not able to
capture a concern that the alleged predator may be deterring entry or expansion (as opposed
to inducing exit). This is because, if the competitor has not yet entered the market . . .it
would not enter . . .unless price were projected to be sufficiently above AVC to allow it to
recoup the additional (sunk) fixed costs of entry. In this case, a standard based on AVC may
be seen to result in underenforcement, as an ‘equally efficient competitor’ may not be able
to enter or to expand even if the dominant firm priced (somewhat) above AVC.”). See also
Crane, supra note 17, at 447 (“In a market characterized by high sunk costs, a mixed bundling scheme might deter entry by a new firm that concluded that the profitability margins
available under the mixed bundling scheme would not allow an adequate return on its investment.”).
186 Amicus Curiae Br. At 12-13, 3M, Inc. v. LePage’s 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004).
187 See, e.g., Dillbary, supra note 177, at 1250-51 (discussing bundle discounts that may
be beneficial); Rubinfield, supra note 46, at 258 (discussing bundles rebates); Crane, supra
note 17, at 446 (discussing bundle discounts).
188 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Informa182
183
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uct that new entrants are unable to match (i.e., “competition on the merits”),
but by convincing them to stay out altogether by exploiting monopoly power in
related markets. Indeed, the effectiveness of this entry-limitation strategy
would be enhanced in the wireless market because the high sunk costs189 in the
telecommunications sector would more quickly lead a firm to decide against
entry when faced with a signal that the entry investment is not worth making.
VI.

FALSE NEGATIVES ARE MORE COMMON THAN BROOKE
GROUP OR CASCADE IMAGINED: CALLING INTO
QUESTION THE DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO
BUNDLED DISCOUNTS

The prior section discussed some of the particular ways in which above-cost
bundled discounts might be employed in anticompetitive ways while surviving
the strictures of the discount attribution test.190 Normatively, this sort of observation should not ordinarily matter all that much; merely demonstrating that a
given legal framework is sometimes underinclusive is of no great moment.
However, as this section will attempt to demonstrate, the prevalence of false
negatives under the discount attribution test is much higher than its proponents
might imagine and, as a result, the Cascade court’s implicit reliance on decision theory191 is not as defensible as it might initially seem.
A. The Prevalence of Industries Prone to False Negatives
This Article has thus far argued that high fixed costs in bundling product
markets, coupled with very low marginal costs in bundling product markets is
tion: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443, 443 (1982) (internal citation omitted) (The dominate firm influences “other firms’ perceptions of the profitability of entering
the firm’s markets, and . . . set[s] its prices [low] in order to deter entry.”).
189 Grunes & Stucke, supra note 176, at 54-55 (citing In the Matter of Implementation of
Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407,
11495, Chart 6 (2010)) (discussing the types of sunk costs necessary to enter the mobile
wireless network).
190 See supra Part IV.B.
191 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2007),
opinion amended and superseded, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Notwithstanding]
aware[ness] that liability under the discount attribution standard has the potential to sweep .
. . broadly, . . . limited judicial experience [counsels for such standard because it will] allow
these difficult issues to further percolate in the lower courts . . . [and it is the preferable option p]ending further judicial and academic inquiry into the prevalence of anticompetitive
bundled discounts.”). See also Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 39, at 82-83 (“[W]hen courts
lack enough information to determine whether particular business conduct will promote
consumer welfare, harm it, or leave it undisturbed . . . courts and agencies are forced to formulate doctrine in the dark . . . [and generally] have done so by employing the decision
theory [which] . . . often suggests a preference for . . . false negatives.”).
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a combination which yields a particular vulnerability to false negatives under
the discount attribution test.192 The example of the quad play bundle has been
used to illustrate, on a more practical level, precisely how this kind of error
might play out in reality. The reason this observation matters for antitrust is
that there is strong evidence that these Type II errors arise in a non-trivial
number of cases.193 Indeed, there is good reason to believe that there is an entire sector of the economy whose structure is wholly inapposite to the application of the discount attribution test, because the requirement of below-cost
pricing effectively shields any above-cost bundled discount, even where it is
anticompetitive in effect.194 Of course, occasional instances of underinclusiveness are not of great concern, but the concern for under-enforcement should
grow when the prevalence of Type II errors grows. The so-called “New Economy,” presents such a case.195 The New Economy has been defined to include
“computers, software programs, Internet-based goods and services, [and] biotechnology,” 196 and is generally “characterized by large initial investments
(‘fixed costs’) and low costs to reproduce individual items (‘variable costs’).197
Software firms, to take one particular example, have high fixed costs,198 and
near zero marginal costs.199 Professor Michael Carrier has concluded that these
See supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra notes 162-64.
194 See, e.g., Schanzenbach, supra note 155, at 71 (describing network industries as “declining cost industries” that can easily “justify a low price by pointing to low marginal costs
or the claim (probably true) that costs will decline or that value will increase as they expand
supply.”).
195 See Sunny Woan, Antitrust in Wonderland: Regulating Markets of Innovation, 27
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 53 (2008).
196 Woan, supra note 195, at 56. Woan also points out that “[t]raditional product markets
generally experience the opposite: the model of perfect competition is characterized by low
fixed costs and higher variable costs.” Id. at 62. She further notes that there are other industries, besides those in the New Economy, that are characterized by high fixed costs and low
variable costs. Id. at 62, n.96 (citing Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, Prepared Remarks Before the Antitrust, Technology and Intellectual Property Conference at the
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology (Mar. 2, 2001)). See also Marleina Paz, Almost
But Not Quite: The Past, Present, and Potential Future of Horizontal Merger Enforcement,
45 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1053, 1095 (2012) (“Another trait of technology-based industries is
that there are initial high fixed costs and subsequent low variable costs related to creating
new products for consumers . . . After these high fixed costs are incurred, companies experience low variable costs because reproducing the good or service is much cheaper than the
initial investment.”) (citations omitted).
197 Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust and Intellectual Property:
Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, Prepared Remarks Before the Antitrust, Technology and Intellectual Property Conference at the Berkeley Center for Law and
Technology (Mar. 2, 2001).
198 Schanzenbach, supra note 155, at 8.
199 See id. (noting that software products generally have low marginal costs); Steven D.
Houck, Injury to Competition/Consumers in High Tech Cases, 75 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 593,
192
193
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firms “usually have high fixed costs, because of significant R&D investments
or the need to invest in networks, but low marginal costs, because the cost of
producing an additional unit is insignificant.”200 In these ways, the New Economy is structurally similar to the telecommunications industry. There is good
reason to believe that the application of the discount attribution test to bundled
discounts in the New Economy would produce similar results to the hypothetical result in the case of the quad play.201 Accurately evaluating bundled discounts in these industries will likely run into the same problems as those identified in the case of the quad play bundle.
B. Decision Theory in Pricing Conduct Cases
Simply put, decision theory is “the branch of microeconomics concerned
with optimal choice in the presence of uncertainty.”202 Devlin and Jacobs note
that, “error is uniquely prevalent in this field because antitrust is routinely
called upon to deliver answers to unsolvable problems.”203 In antitrust, as this
Article has pointed out, the modern law reflects a decided preference for false
negatives over false positives.204 This is explicit in decisions such as Matsushita205 and Brooke Group,206 as well as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cascade.207 This approach, in the context of evaluating pricing conduct, also operationalized Bork’s insight that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and
even more rarely successful.”208 Thus, the modern preference for false negatives over false positives is based upon a combination of factors: false positives
601 (2001) (noting that marginal costs in intellectual property industries often approach
zero). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reciting
Microsoft’s counsel’s admission at oral argument that Java and Navigator’s “marginal costs
[were] essentially zero”).
200 Carrier, supra note 41, at 815.
201 See, e.g., Schanzenbach, supra note 155, at 69-71 (explaining how “declining cost
industries” can easily “justify a low price by pointing to low marginal costs”); Paz, supra
note 196, at 1095 (explaining that once the “high fixed costs are incurred, companies experience low variable costs because reproducing the good or service is much cheaper than the
initial investment”) (citations omitted)).
202 Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 39, at 83.
203 Id. at 79.
204 See, e.g., id.
205 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-91,
593-95 (1986).
206 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220-24
(1993).
207 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 911, 918-19 (9th Cir.
2007), opinion amended and superseded, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
208 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590-91 (1986)
(citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 149-55
(1978)).
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chill vigorous price competition and anticompetitive harm through low-pricing
is extremely rare,209 in addition to other factors not considered here.210
As the prior sub-section argued, the rub in the decision-theoretic approach is
that false negatives are not as rare or even uncommon as the approach assumes
them to be, or at least as the court in Cascade thought them to be. As a result,
the use of conventional decision theory in evaluating bundled discounts is less
justified than the Ninth Circuit would have it.211 Since the use of this theory is
at least in part driven by the notion that competitive harm from low-pricing is
relatively uncommon,212 a finding that this is actually common undermines the
justification for using it in this context. Moreover, there is no indication in the
Ninth Circuit’s decision that the court considered the possibility that its rule of
above-cost legality would produce these types of errors.213 Perhaps counsel
209 Michael Salinger’s analysis of Matshusita’s legacy provides a helpful distillation of
the concerns that undergird the modern law’s approach to uncertainty in adjudicating pricing
conduct. Michael Salinger, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 475, 477 (2007). He points to several important statements in that decision, including: “predator pricing schemes are rarely tried, and
even more rarely successful” and “mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”
Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986)).
210 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1984). Easterbrook’s argument was that the market will correct erroneous condemnation of
a given business practice produces a larger social cost than erroneous acceptance of an anticompetitive business practice. For example, he argued that, “judicial errors that tolerate
baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.” Id. at 3.
211 Jonathan Rubin has argued against using decision theory in the context of bundled
discounts, but for different reasons than those proposed here. Rubin, supra note 27, at 5-6.
Rather than examining the efficacy of the approach in certain markets, as is the method used
here, Rubin argues that that the differences between bundled discounts and single-product
predatory pricing are such that the use of decision theory is not justified in the former case.
Id. For example, Rubin argues:
Bundling lacks the short-term consumer benefit of lower prices or higher bids
and does not impart an unambiguous short-run benefit. Whether a particular instance of bundling does or does not create consumer surplus in a particular case
would depend on the circumstances. Not so with predatory pricing, in which
every penny of lower prices during the “pre recoupment” phase inures to the
benefit of consumers. As a result, a decision-theoretic, cost-based rule may be
justified for predatory pricing, where the risk of a false positive arguably overwhelms the costs of making a correct decision. Decision-theoretic liability rules,
however, are not appropriate for bundling, or other exclusionary strategies.
Id. (emphasis in original).
212 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 475 U.S. at 588-91, 593-95; Brooke Grp.
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220-24 (1993); Cascade Health
Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 911 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion amended and superseded, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)).
213 The Cascade court “rejected . . . the notion that above-cost prices . . . [ever] inflict
injury to competition under the antitrust laws.” Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 911,
opinion amended and superseded, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd.
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never brought it to the court’s attention that the rule would operate in such a
way in certain (i.e., high technology, New Economy, communications, etc.)
markets because the case involved litigation between hospitals.214 Carrying the
argument to its logical extreme, one commentator has argued that, “a costbased rule allows high technology firms to evade predatory pricing liability
entirely, because the marginal cost of producing most intellectual property is
zero.”215 In other words, the law’s bias for false negatives has left a wide loophole for firms in certain industries to use strategic pricing in ways that existing
rules, based on application of decision theory, are not equipped to address.
This problem suggests that the law ought to start giving increased solicitude to
concerns that low-pricing is being employed anticompetitively in industries
categorized by the structural features described in the last sub-section.216
VII.

CONCLUSION

This simple illustration of the prospective antitrust concerns raised by the
quad play bundle reveals that the Ninth Circuit’s “discount attribution” test
suffers from substantial weaknesses. These flaws come to the fore in the case
of the quad play bundle. This discussion has shown that the Commercial
Agreements between Verizon Wireless and the Cable Defendants would allow
the quad play to be marketed in ways that would be anticompetitive yet still
legal under a cost-based rule of per se legality for above-cost bundled dis-

v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)). The court mentions
only the risks of false positives, stating that the Supreme Court has “cautioned [it] that ‘the
costs of erroneous findings of predatory-pricing liability were quite high [if above-cost is
used] because [t]he mechanism . . . is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition.” Id. at 913 (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 319 (2007)) (last alteration in original).
214 For example, a review of Plaintiff McKenzie–Willamette Hospital’s complaint, trial
memorandum, and response to renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law reveals no
mention that false negatives occur in bundled discount situations. See, e.g., Complaint of
Plaintiff McKenzie–Willamette Hospital, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 02-6032-TC);
Plaintiff McKenzie-Willamette Hospital’s Trial Memorandum, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007)
(No. 02-6032-HA); Plaintiff McKenzie-Willamette Hospital’s Response to Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 02-6032-HA).
215 Thomas Piraino, Jr. has distilled this insight in the context of pure predatory pricing
through the following assertion: “[A] cost-based rule allows high technology firms to evade
predatory pricing liability entirely, because the marginal cost of producing most intellectual
property is zero.” Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 126 (2002) (citing Patrick Bolton et al.,
Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2285 (2000)).
216 Of course, there is the possibility that this could undermine a uniform approach to
evaluating the legality of bundled discounts across the economy. It remains to be seen
whether this concern can be adequately addressed by the modification or adaptation of existing approaches.

2014]

False Negatives Under a Discount Attribution Test

107

counts. The Ninth Circuit’s discount attribution test incorporates Brooke
Group-based fears of not only chilling pro-competitive price-cutting due to
false positives, but also concerns over limited judicial ability to evaluate bundling practices. The result is that anticompetitive bundles are likely to escape
scrutiny given certain market characteristics: very high fixed costs in bundling
products and very low average variable costs on bundled products.
In this Article, I have tried to make the case that the incidence of false negatives under a discount attribution test for bundled discounts is likely to be
much higher than the theory underlying the test assumes. To that end, I have
used a real-world example to illustrate how a Type II error would be likely to
occur, and have argued that industries prone to Type II errors are much more
prevalent in our economy than Cascade (and Brooke Group) thought. These
conclusions indicate that the value of an above-cost safe harbor for bundled
discounts should be questioned, since the justification for this rule derives in
large part from the notion that false negatives are so unlikely so as not to be
worth antitrust law’s notice. At the very least, should be accepted with a caveat. If the Supreme Court ultimately endorses the discount attribution test for
evaluating bundled discounts, this would not mean that the Court sees all
above-cost bundled discounts as pro-competitive or competitively-neutral. This
much is clear from existing case law, which apparently acknowledges the theoretical possibility of competitive harm where there is no below-cost pricing.
The adoption of the rule would likely represent a judgment that it is better that
some anticompetitive bundling go undetected, than that pro-competitive bundling be deterred in the first instance for fear of a wrongfully-awarded treble
damages award; this would reflect an extension of the decision-theoretic approach that pervades modern antitrust law into the realm of bundled discounting practices. However, the approach leads to rules that may be much more
underinclusive than their proponents imagine. There may be entire industries,
notably the telecommunications and New Economy sectors, where anticompetitive bundling is almost entirely immune from liability even where bundled
discounts are anti-competitively used. This Article has tried to identify reasons
that the discount attribution test is far from accurate in many cases, and has
explained the difficulties that follow where liability rules for bundled discounts
rely upon a decision-theoretic approach which is not be justified in several
large and important sectors of the economy.

